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The "regressive tendency" 10 in the most recent case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) reflects the uncertainty of the times. The CJEU's decisions in Dano or Alimanovic appear to be a step back from Martinez Sala, Grzelczyk and Zambrano, 11 where European Citizenship is concerned. There is also a heated debate between Eurosceptics and integrationists regarding the existence of a democratic deficit in the EU. Nigel Farage frequently accused the EU of being undemocratic in the campaign for the referendum in the United Kingdom (UK). When discussing this issue, the most avid integrationists usually invoke a seemingly irreproachable formal argument: the MPEs are elected to the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage (Art. 14, 3, TEU). Second, both the European Council and the Council of the European Union are elected in their Member States [Arts. 15(2) and 16(2) TUE] and the President of the European Commission is proposed by the European Council "taking into account the elections to the European Parliament and after having held the appropriate consultations" and is "elected" in the European Parliament "by a majority of its component members" [Art. 17(7), TEU]. In theory, the argument is flawless. In practice, it is deeply flawed. The fact is that there is only one true European election, and from that election, four "democratic" institutions materialise. These institutions have the monopoly on the legislative and executive power in the EU. By comparison, in the US, at a federal level, there are separate elections for both houses of Congress and for the President of the United States. We believe that the Commission would greatly benefit from the additional legitimacy of a President that is directly elected by the citizens, like his American counterpart.
12 We should also keep in mind that the influence of the European Council may go beyond what is enshrined in the Article 15, 1, TEU. . This scenario raises two very serious issues: i) the vast majority of the voters elect those representatives for the national government without even knowing that they are also electing them for the Council of the European Union. This is to be expected since national issues are a more pressing concern in the minds of the voters, thus the focus of most national political campaigns. However, one could argue that the representatives' democratic legitimacy in the EU is weakened since democracy should reflect "the will of the people". Furthermore, even if the voter is taking into consideration the election for the Council of the European Union, the method is undemocratic by design. A candidate may be an excellent pick for finance minister but the voter may find him a poor negotiator that should not represent the country in the Council of the European Union. This puts the voter in a "no win" situation, since he may either have an excellent finance minister or an excellent negotiator, never both, because they are voted as a package. In Member States where the government has no legislative powers, or has its legislative power restricted the issue is even more complicated. It does not seem reasonable for the EU to give the national representatives legislative powers when they do not have them in their own countries. It might even endanger the separation of powers in those Member States. A proper Senate would also contribute to the proximity between the voter and its elected representative in the EU. The second resolution, drafted by the MPE Guy Verhofstadt (ADLE), 16 proposes a structural reform 17 from where we would highlight: ii) the attribution of the right of legislative initiative to the European Parliament (point 62); ending "Europe à la carte" (points 6 through 12); iii) the "undertaking [of] a comprehensive, in-depth review of the Lisbon Treaty".
The White Paper on the future of Europe published by the European Commission on 1 March, 2017, forming the Commission's contribution to the Rome Summit of 25 March 2017, lists five possible scenarios for maintaining the Unity of "the EU at 27".
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The possible scenarios for the evolution of the EU until 2025 per the Commission are: i) "carrying on" -this scenario basically maintains the status quo; ii) "nothing but the single market" -the most Eurosceptic solution which keeps the single market and removes everything else; iii) "those who want more do more" -the multi-speed Europe scenario: the 17 The implementation of some of the proposals in the resolution would require amendments in the TEU and TFEU. 18 See "Commission presents White Paper on the future of Europe: Avenues for unity for the EU at 27", European Commission, accessed Mar. 1, 2017, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-385_en.htm.
Member States may integrate at their own pace;
19 iv) "doing less more efficiently" -the EU intervenes less but in a more effective and united manner; v) "doing much more together" -further integration and a more interventive EU. All the Member States commit equally. The lack of substance in the "White Paper" is truly disappointing. The Commission lists the possible scenarios for the future that were already known to the public, offering no contribution or new path to the EU's development.
2016 in two chapters
Two events in the year of 2016 changed the World's political landscape: "Leave's" victory in the "United Kingdom European Union membership referendum" and Donald Trump's victory in the United States Presidential Election. Usually, the discussion of these events focused on finding out "how" and "how much" these events will change the status quo. However, one should not forget that these events already changed the status quo and are themselves, a reflection of previous changes in our world. Therefore, it is of extreme importance that we first understand the past and present if we wish to predict the future.
Chapter I: until the referendum tears us apart
On 23 June 2016, a political earthquake with its epicentre in the UK hit the EU. Against all predictions, the British people voted to leave the EU. "Leave's" victory in the referendum was not overwhelming (51.9% against 48.1%) but it was convincing. The high turnout (72.2%) assured that there is no room to question the democratic legitimacy of the referendum.
At the beginning of the night, practically no one was expecting such a result. Exit polls gave a 4% lead to "remain" and Nigel Farage conceded defeat. 20 However, a few disappointing results in traditionally euro-enthusiastic parts of the country and a high turnout in more conservative ones quickly turned the tide in brexit's favour.
The referendum's results broke the UK in two. Scotland and Northern Ireland voted "remain" by wide margins whereas Wales and England voted "leave". 21 In the aftermath, the Prime Minister David Cameron resigned. Cameron had called the referendum as a political move to ensure his re-election, but he did not expect to lose it. A petition signed by more than 4 million people requested a second referendum on the matter but was quickly rejected by the new cabinet, led by Theresa May. 24 Some supporters of Brexit were furious with the decision, even calling the judges "enemies of the people".
25 Following the Court's decision, the House of Commons approved the European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Bill quickly and by a wide majority. The bill was met with greater opposition in the House of Lords, where it was amended to give Parliament a "meaningful vote" on the final deal between the EU and the UK and to ensure the protection of the rights of the three million EU citizens living in the UK.
26 In a stroke of legislative irony, the unelected House of Lords seems adamant in protecting parliamentary sovereignty while the House of Commons promptly gave the government absolute power. In the end, the Lords will probably relent but the amendments might trigger a "parliamentary ping-pong" between the Houses and delay the government's plan to trigger Article 50 by the end of March 2017.
Even if it is not in the government's designated timeframe, these internal struggles will be overcome. After that, the UK and the EU must negotiate the terms of their separation. It may be an "amicable divorce" where the economic and social effects of the UK leaving are reduced by it joining the European Economic Area (EEA). On the opposite end of the spectrum, there is the option of a hard Brexit with no trade deal between the UK and the EU. The UK and the EU would engage in trading according to the rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO). In between these scenarios, in abstract, we could also have the "Swiss Model" (EFTA but not EEE), the "Turkish Model" (Customs Union) and the option of building a completely new trade deal. 27 At the time of writing, the unwillingness of both parties to compromise on the issue of free movement of persons points to a hard Brexit. Nevertheless, since negotiations have not begun, it is not possible to predict with any degree of certainty.
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The UK always viewed European integration with a certain degree of scepticism. Several exceptions had to be built in the European legal framework to accommodate the UK's demands. It is not part of the Eurozone and of the Schengen Area. British scepticism might not be scepticism of just the EU but also, of Europeans in general and of immigration. 30 Without it, the EU may find it easier to achieve further integration. But only if it can overcome its "existential crisis", caused by the populist wave that has swept across the EU.
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Leaving the biggest trade bloc in the world will surely have economic consequences. Since the referendum, the British Pound has been falling against other major currencies. At the time of writing, 1,00£ is worth less than 1,20€ and 1,25$. Before the referendum, it was worth 1,30€ and 1,47$. As of result of Pound's decline in value, companies who export to the UK had to raise prices. Microsoft's readjustment of prices may cost millions to taxpayers. 32 Unilever also raised Marmite's prices, causing disputes between the manufacturer and some retailers. 33 One could argue that a weaker Pound would help exports from the UK and thus, reduce Brexit's negative effects. While it may happen in theory, its effect will not probably be enough to counterbalance the negative effect that leaving with no deal would have on the economy. In that regard, the initial resistance of the British economy seems to be finally subsiding. 34 Nevertheless, we should wait for the official negotiations to begin and then make the analysis of the economic effects in both economies.
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Taking back control of British laws might not be immediately possible. European Legislation constitutes a crucial part of the UK's legal framework. The British government plans on "converting directly effective EU law into UK law, and preserving secondary legislation enacted under the ECA" 36 amending it in accordance with the country's needs subsequently. This raises a very different issue since "while it is questionable as to whether or not there will ever be sufficient time or resources to undertake an adequate scrutiny, it seems that there will be plenty of time for MPs, businesses and interest groups to lobby for the selective amendment or repeal of particular laws". 37 Commerce may suffer even more if the UK and EU's legal framework deviate too much. As an example, the UK may adopt lower food safety, consumer protection or data protection standards.
The EU and its Member States shall also feel deeply the effects of Brexit. The EU will lose about 5% of its budget and the remaining Member States might have to make up for it. The weaker Pound may decrease the purchasing power of British citizens, thus adversely affecting countries that export to the UK. If there is a hard Brexit, the possible re-imposition of import duties might further complicate the situation.
Chapter II: Trump comes, sees and conquers
In 2008, Barack Obama, a young and charismatic senator from Illinois, achieved a surprising victory over the establishment candidate in the Democratic Party Primary elections. Obama lost the popular vote to Hillary Clinton in the Primary, but the Democratic Party united around him and he was able to easily defeat John McCain to become the 44 th President of the United States. Obama is a brilliant public speaker and his message of hope and the "Yes, We Can" slogan connected with the American voter, allowing him to serve two terms in the White House and leave with an unusually high approval rating.
In Trump's victory surprised most political analysts who did not believe that he could win the Republican Primaries much less the Presidential Election. The Huffington Post's Pollster gave him a 1.7% probability of winning. Nate Silver gave him 28.2% and almost every other mainstream analyst followed in between. 39 In fact, the unusually high chances given to Trump by Nate Silver prompted accusations that he was swaying the results of the polls in Trump's favour. 40 In the end, neither the Huffington Post nor Silver's "FiveThirtyEight" were right. Silver predicted that Trump's path to victory depended on victories in Florida, Nevada, North-Carolina, and New Hampshire (all unlikely). However, Trump won in Wisconsin ("FiveThirtyEight" gave him a 15,9% probability of winning there), Michigan (19,7%) and Pennsylvania (22,6%) and lost Nevada and New Hampshire. 41 In the betting markets, the Irish company Paddy Power was so sure of Clinton's victory that it paid early to those who betted on her. 42 Trump won democratically but why? This question shall occupy political analysts for the next few years. The theories regarding the Trump's success are numerous and contradictory. We shall list some: i) "Political Correctness", also known as the "PC Culture", went too far and thus a counterculture emerged and united behind a pragmatic businessman helping him seize victory;
43 ii) the Republican Party suffered a coup by an outsider; iii) the Russians influenced the elections; iv) the voters from the rural communities felt that the mainstream politicians are disconnected from their needs and thus decided to elect an outsider; v) the US population is racist, sexist and xenophobic; vi) minorities voted in inferior numbers when compared to Obama's election, thus giving an advantage to the Republican Party; vi) Hillary Clinton was a flawed candidate and was not able to bring Bernie Sanders' supporters to her side when it mattered; vii) Wikileaks' mail leaks helped Trump; viii) the FBI investigation on Clinton's usage of a personal server for governmental purposes and James Comey's declarations derailed her campaign. At the time of writing, no consensus has been reached and, since the issue is still sensitive in the American society, no consensus will be reached until proper historical detachment is possible.
In his campaign, Trump criticised mega-regional trade agreements that are, in his opinion, responsible for "stealing" American jobs. 44 In his first week as President, he withdrew the USA from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). 45 The USA was the biggest economy in the trade agreement and the main political force behind it. 46 Without it, TPP's chances of survival are slim. The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) between the USA and the EU (representing 46% of the World's GDP) will probably, at the least, suffer significant delays. The TTIP also faces criticism in the EU 47 since Greenpeace leaked some secret documents related to its negotiations. 48 European consumers are worried that the TTIP might degrade food safety, environmental standards 49 and workers' rights 50 in the name of free trade. 51 The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), as promised by Trump, will be renegotiated. 52 The Trump Administration wants to reduce the burden of "excessive" regulation on companies. Such reduction shall entail environmental deregulation and deregulation of the financial system. Despite only being in the first few months of the Trump administration, the President already signed executive orders related to these issues. 
